The Individual Employment Contract Under The Wagner Act: II by Hoeniger, Heinrich
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 10 Issue 3 Article 2 
1941 
The Individual Employment Contract Under The Wagner Act: II 
Heinrich Hoeniger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Heinrich Hoeniger, The Individual Employment Contract Under The Wagner Act: II, 10 Fordham L. Rev. 389 
(1941). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol10/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT UNDER
THE WAGNER ACT: II
HEINPICH HOENIGERt
V. The Irregular Employee Status*
T HE irregular employee status refers to anomalous conditions of affairs
in industrial relations. Individuals who actually are not working
are nevertheless considered employees. Three types of this status have
already been distinguished:' (1) The employees might have been hired
and out of work because of a labor dispute without any unfair labor
practice of the employer (constructive not remediable status), (2) the
employees might have been hired and out of work because of unfair
labor practice (constructive remediable status), or (3) finally, they might
not have been hired at all and nevertheless considered as employees be-
cause unfair labor practice might have already interfered with and
hindered their hiring (quasi-employee status).
The irregular employee status in all its three phases is of enormous
importance in labor relations. It is through the first type of this status
that the right to strike obtains its momentum. The worker can go on
strike without losing his job since he is retaining his employee status.
The second and the third phases of this status which involve unfair labor
practice are remediable. In actual practice the remedies in question
are the teeth in the law. They constitute the sanctions against unfair labor
practice. The exposition of the irregular employee status is, therefore, not
a purely academic discussion. It is a topic of exceedingly practical
significance. Clarification of the remediable types of the irregular em-
ployee status means nothing else than showing forth the scope and
efficacy of the sanctions against unfair labor practices.
Constitutionality
All three types of this status have one factor in common. In all
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University, Graduate School. It is my privilege to express my gratitude to the Carl
Schurz Memorial Foundation which enabled me to secure the assistance of Dr. Paul
Fischer. I wish to acknowledge his valuable collaboration in completing this compre-
hensive survey.
* The preceding installment of this article appears in 10 FORDHA-M L. RaV. 14,
which covered the following sections: I Individual Employment Contract and Individual
Bargain; II The Individual Bargain; M Individual Employment Contract and Employment
Contract and Employment Status; IV The Regular Employee Status.
1. Hoeniger, The Individual Employment Contract Under the Wagner Act (1941) 10
FomHku. L. REv. 14, 33, 34.
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of them the right of the employer to discharge and select workers is
restricted through statutory2 provisions, especially through the Wagner
Act. As easily could be foreseen, these statutory restrictions had to be
tested with regard to their constitutionality. It was argued that they
violate freedom of contract. The U. S. Supreme Court, however, rejected
this objection.3 It recognized the validity of the statutory provisions in
question, in a series of decisions, and very recently, it approved the
most contested case of the quasi-employee status.
The earliest decisions, in April 1937, refer to the remedial phase of
the constructive employee status. The two remedies which exert the
most trenchant influence upon the employer's right to select and discharge
were considered to be constitutional. Freedom of contract was held4
not to be impaired by reinstatement and back-pay orders, so widely used
in cases of unfair labor practice.
In May 1938, in NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co.,5 the
Supreme Court clarified the constitutionality of the provision of the
Wagner Act, that strikers retain their employee status and remain pro-
tected against the unfair labor practices denounced by the Act. Through
this decision the non-remediable phase of the constructive employee
status is recognized. In these two cases of the constructive employee
status the employment relations were originally established through in-
dividual contracts of hiring; they are simply protracted by the operation
of law over periods during which the constructive employees are actually
out of work. In contrast to these two phases, in the third phase, the
2. These statutory restrictions are to be distinguished from those which are voluntarily
entered into through collective agreements. As mentioned above, these latter kind of
restrictions are not to be dealt with in this article.
3. It should be noted that the U. S. Supreme Court presented its basic view on the
principle of freedom of contract and the power of Congress under the Constitution to
restrict such freedom of contract in Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300
U. S. 515 as well as in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Ernest Parish et al., 300 U. S. 379. Both
these decisions were handed down on March 29, 1937, that is, only two weeks prior to the
earliest decisions concerning the NLRA (infra note 4) which were handed down on April 12,
1937.
4. NLRB v. Jones & Loughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 45, 47 (1937); NLRB v.
Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks, 301 U. S. 58,
81 (1937).
5. "Congress may impose upon contractual relations reasonable regulations calculated to
protect commerce against threatened industrial strife .... The provision of the Act continuing
the relationship of the employer and employee . . . is a regulation of the same sort . . !"
and does not interfere with the usual exercise of the right of the employer to select and
discharge its employees. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, 347,
348 (1938).
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quasi-employee has never been hired through an individual contract.
There is no question of extending already existing employment relations
and of putting back to work men who were for a certain period out of
work. There is no question of reinstatement. In this status outsiders
are to be "instated", i.e. treated as if they were hired although they were
actually refused employment.' The question is: May the NLRB order
employment with back-pay of persons-not employees as defined by the
Wagner Act-who have been refused jobs because of their union member-
ship or activity? If the Board is empowered to do so, then orders of this
kind establish the quasi-employee status. This question was highly
disputed,, and opposing views were held by the courts of appeal.' The
NLRB has continued to issue such "instatement" orders.' The U. S.
Supreme Court has very recently approved of the Board's practice in
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, and thus confirmed the quasi-employee
status.
The exposition of the entire scheme of the irregular employee status
requires discussion of complicated problems and a variety of phases. It
will be discussed in the following order: first, the conditions creating the
three different phases of the status; second, the implications of this status;
third, its termination. Because the problem of the termination of the
irregular status is shrouded in confusion a fourth subdivision is necessary.
Solution thereof may be found under the guidance of recent decisions of
the Supreme Court by discerning the private law and the public law
aspect in employment relations.
1. Conditions Creating the Irregular Status
The three types of the irregular employee status require different
presuppositions.
1. The non-remediable phase of this status is present if an individual
ceases to work "as a consequence of, or in connection with any current
labor dispute"'1 and when no unfair labor practice of the employer is
involved. The term "labor dispute" is defined by the Act as:
,6. The term "instatement" has recently been used by writers. See 7 L.R.R. 459 (1941)
with respect to NLRB v. Waumbec Mills, 114 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
7. The "instatement" order of the NLRB was sustained and ordered to be enforced in
NLRB v. Waumbec Mills, Inc., 114 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940). On the other hand,
it was refused enforcement in NLRB v. National Casket Co., 107 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A.
2d, 1939) and Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 113 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
8. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 26 NLRB No. 113 (1940). See note 37 infra.
9. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 113 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 312 U. S. 669 (1941).
10. NLRA No. 2 (3), 29 U. S. C. A. No. 152 (3). See Hoeniger, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 31.
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"including any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment
or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee.""-
This definition dispels doubts which have arisen with respect to other
statutes.'2 These doubts center around the problem whether "labor dis-
pute" is to be construed to mean only disputes concerning those between
whom the proximate relationship had already existed and was temporarily
interrupted by the dispute.'8 Moreover, in the cases which are to be
scrutinized here, the cessation of work affects doubtlessly the im-
mediate relation between employer and employees. Therefore, this
particular type of the crucial questions with respect to the problem of
labor disputes does not come up in this connection. Other problems,
however, remain to be solved, particularly the question arising, when a
stoppage of work ceases to be a "current" labor dispute. We may say
that this is the case if the places of employees out of work are filled
and normal production is going on.' The question, however, still re-
mains: To what extent can strikers and other irregular employees out
of work be replaced? Such replacement, if possible, would terminate
their employee status. The whole question of replacement will, there-
fore, fittingly be discussed in connection with the question of the termina-
tion of the irregular status. The practical importance of this question
is obvious.
The second characteristic of the non-remedial phase of the irregular
status is the absence of unfair labor practice. This in turn is the reason
why no remedies are provided by the NLRA. Consequently the Board
has no jurisdiction over the employer in these cases,' 5 at least, so far as
11. NLRA No. 2 (9), 29 U. S. C. A. No. 152 (9).
12. For instance with regard to the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Norris-La Guardia Act
No. 13. However, even these doubts have been considerably reduced recently through the
decision of the Supreme Court in U. S. v. Hutcheson 61 Sup. Ct. 463 (1941).
13. See JAEGER, CASES AND STATUTES ON LABOR LAW (1939) 233 headnote; uIIAAxO,
THE WAGNER Acr (1940) 95-152; SHARP AND GREGORY, SOCIAL CHANGE AND LABOR LAW
(1939) 137-145; Van Dusen, The Progress of Labor Law (1939) 14 TEaZI. L. Q. 1; Etter,
Statutory Definitions of "Labor Dispute" (1938) 19 ORE. L. REv. 81, 201; Hogan, The Fiftl
Decade of Federal Legislation in the Field of Labor Disputes (1939) 28 GEo. L. J. 343.
14. Standard Lime & Stone Co., 17 NLRB 147 (1939); Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-
Overland, Inc., 263 Fed. 171, 187 (N. D. Ohio, 1919); Quinlivan v. Dail-Overland Co.,
274 Fed. 56, 65 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921); Jeffrey-de Witt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F. (2d)
134, 138 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 731 (1937) ; Standard Insulation Co.
Inc., 22 NLRB No. 46 (1940).
15. Black Diamond S. S. Co. v. NLRB, 94 F. (2d) 875, 879 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert.
denied, 304 U. S. 579 (1939). Note (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 1369, 1370, n. 11.
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prevention of unfair labor practices as provided in section 10 of the NLRA
is concerned. On the other hand, the Board is empowered as well as
compelled to pass judgment on this status in representation and election
cases. It has to determine whether and to what extent irregular employees
of the non-remediable type of this status are eligible to vote in elections,
and has done so in numerous instances."8
The third element on which the non-remedial phase of the irregular
employee status is conditioned is also a negative one. It derives from
definition of the term "employee" in Section 2 (3) of the NLRA.J7 This
definition excepts such individuals who are out of work from the irregular
employee status "who have obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment." What we are to understand by "regular and
substantially equivalent employment" is to a large extent already clarified
in litigation18 in determining the equivalence of the new employment,
present working conditions at the plant of the former employee are to be
taken into account rather than those existing at the cessation of work.19
Until very recent times, this negative element of absence of any
equivalent employMent was often considered to be a common prerequisite
of the three different phases of the irregular employee status. In other
words, the two remediable types of the irregular status were often thought
to be conditioned also upon the fact that the irregular employee in
question had not obtained any other equivalent employment at the
time of the beginning of the procedure concerning prevention of unfair
labor practices. The decision of the Supreme Court in Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 0 has clarified this issue. Absence of any other equivalent
employment is an indispensable prerequisite only in the case of the non-
remediable phase of the irregular status. The reasons for this' are as
follows: This phase of the status has. as its legal basis only the employee
-definition of the Act referred to above."' This definition is to be
16. See Fifth Annual Report of the NLRB at 58 (1941).
17. See Hoeniger op. cit. supra, note 1 at 31.
18. NLRB v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 533, 538 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), cert. denied,
306 U. S. 646 (1939); NLRB v. Botany Worsted Mills, 106 F. (2d) 263, 269 (C. C. A. 3d,
1939); Pulaski Veneer Corp., 10 NLRB 136, 154 (1938); Boss Mfg. Co., 11 NLRB 432,
440 (1938). For a discussion of what constitutes regular and substantially equivalent
employment see ROSENrARB, TEm NATIONAL LABOR PoLiCY AND How IT WoxKs (1940) 548.
19. Mooresville Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 94 F. (2d) 61, 66 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938),
110 F. (2d) 179, 180 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940). The opposite opinion is held by the NLRB in
Louisville Refining Co., 4 NLRB 844, 873 (1936); Keystone Freight Lines, 24 NLRB 128
(1940). But see dissenting opinion of Board Member Leiserson.
20. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 312 U. S. 669 (1941).
21. See note 17 supra.
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applied as we have seen, particularly in representation and election cases,
i.e., in the operation of section 9 of the Act. There it becomes undoubtedly
necessary to determine what employees of a certain employer form an
appropriate bargaining unit and are eligible to vote or otherwise designate
representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining. With regard to
such representation employees out of work who have obtained regular and
equivalent other employment cease to be "employees" in the sense of the
Act. Conditions are different if unfair labor practice is involved. The
power of the Board to order affirmative remedial action in case of unfair
labor practice is derived from section 10 of the Act. Neither the phrasing
nor the intrinsic purpose of these provisions necessarily limit remediable
actions to those employees out of work who have not obtained regular
and equivalent employment. It is in the discretionary power of the
Board to determine whether or not, in a given case, the undoing of dis-
crimination requires the reinstatement also of those employees out of work
who have obtained such equivalent employment.
2. The second type of the irregular status is constituted by the two
elements: first, that the individuals once had been hired and second that
their work has ceased because of unfair labor practice of the employer.
The term unfair labor practice is defined by the Act itself22 and is
clarified by a host of board and court decisions.2" It is also clearly estab-
lished that unfair labor practice may precede, accompany or succeed
the cessation of work.24 Furthermore, it does not matter whether the
employee stops working of his own accord in the event of a strike because
22. NLRA Nos. 2 (8), 8, 29 U. S. C. A. Nos. 152 (8), 158.
23. See Third Annual Report of NLRB 58-104 (1939); Fourth Annual Report of NLRB
57-73 (1940); Fifth Annual Report of NLRB 32-53 (1941); Report of the New York
State LRB for the period from July 1, 1937 to Dec. 31, 1939 39-92 (1940). For strikes caused
by unfair labor practice, see Foster Bros. Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 1 NLRB 880, 889 (1936),
rev'd, 85 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936); Brown Shoe Co., 1 NLRB 803, 825 (1936);
Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 5 NLRB 577, 590-592 (1938); Remington Rand v. NLRB, 94 F.
(2d) 862, 866 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 576 (1938); Jeffrey-de Witt
Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F. (2d) 134 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937), 302 U. S. 731 (1937). For
strikes prolonged by unfair labor practice see Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 2 NLRB
125, 127-132 (1936); Black Diamond S. S. Co. v. NLRB, 94 F. (2d) 875, 878 (C. C. A. 2d,
1938), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 579 (1938).
24. Note (1939) 39 CoL. L. REv. 1369. For unfair labor practice preceding and accom-
panying cessation of work, see Pacific Greyhound Lines, 2 NLRB 431, 438 (1936), 91 F.
(2d) 458, 459 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), 303 U. S. 272, 274 (1938); Globe Mail Service, 2 NLRB
610, 616 (1937); NLRB v. Remington Rand, 2 NLRB 626, 632-646 (193-7), 94 F. (2d)
862, 866 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), 304 U. S. 590 (1938); National Casket Co., Inc., 1 NLRB 963,
966 (1936), 12 NLRB 165 (1939). For unfair labor practice subsequent to cessation of work
see Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 2 NLRB 125, 128 (1936).
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of unfair labor practice or is forced to stop by the employer. Stoppage
of work caused by the employer might take the permanent form of dis-
charge of the individual lock-out 5 of a number of employees at the
same time or it might be intruded only for a temporary period, the so-
called lay-off or furlough.2" In addition, employees are considered to be
out of work in consequence of unfair labor practice when they have
ceased working as a means of protesting against discriminatory demotion 27
which result in work under adverse conditions such as lower wages,
or merely temporary employment, or labor entailing more peril to life.
The same is true with regard to employees who ceased working because
of the employer's failure to provide protection against assault and
eviction by an anti-union faction of employees. When they ceased work-
ing they lost their job in consequence of unfair labor practice. 8
The remediable constructive employee status will be obtained: first,
by employees who go on strike, are locked out or laid off because of
unfair labor practice; secondly, by those who are discriminatorily dis-
charged; and thirdly, by those who cease working because of dis-
criminatory demotion or similar kind of unfair labor practice. It is clear
that discharge is not a requisite of discrimination.29
25. S. L. Allen & Co., Inc., 1 NLRB 714, 722 (1936); Canvas Glove Mfg. Works, Inc.,
1 NLRB 519, 525 (1936) ; NLRB v. Lund, 103 F. (2d) 815, 818 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
26. See NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 1 NLRB 1, 36 (1935), aff'd, 91 F. (2d)
178 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937), 303 U. S. 261 (1938); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing
Co., 1 NLRB 411, 428 (1936), rev'd, 85 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), but aff'd 301 U. S.
58 (1937).
27. Harlan Fuel Co., 8 NLRB 25 (1938) (transfer amounting to discharge, where .an
employee was transferred from his position as trackman, and then assigned an unsafe
working place); Clover Fork Coal Co. v. NLRB, 97 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938)
(transfer to work under adverse conditions which would result in loss of pay); R. C.
Hoiles, 13 NLRB 1122 (1939) (employee who was in charge of the composing room was
transferred to the status of a printer); Waggoner Refining Co., Inc., 6 NLRB 731 (1938)
(employee who had charge of the treating and loading work was demoted to yard labor);
The Press Co., Inc., et al., 13 NLRB 630 (1939) every able feature-story writer was demoted
from handling important news stories to routine work on obituaries). Order of the Board
modified rehearing denied, The Press Co. et al. v. NLRB, 118 F. (2d) 937 (1941).
28. Mooresville Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 94 F. (2d) 61, 66 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938); NLRB
v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 98 F. (2d) 488, 493, 494 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
29. NLRB v. Star Pub. Co., 97 F. (2d) 465, 470 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938). Since discharge
is not a requisite of discrimination, the term "implied" or "constructive" discharge does not
expedite the current analysis of the cases in question. This term was introduced by
Professor Chester C. Ward. Ward, "Discrimination" Under The National Labor Reations
Act (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1152, and adopted by RosEN=Amn, op. cit. supra note 18, at 144.
It rather beclouds the fact that it is the unfair labor practice causing either the cessation
of work or the hiring and not the formal act of discharge which creates the remediable types
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
By whatever means unfair labor practice may have been committed
against employees who are now out of work, the Wagner Act provides
remedies in each of these cases. These remedies vary from mere rein-
statement without any back-pay to reinstatement with back-pay either
in part or in full. The Board directs back-pay only to irregular employees
who are discriminated against, and patterns in each case the back-pay
order to the circumstances of the case. Unfair labor practice may be
committed, e.g. by refusal of the employer to bargain collectively in good
faith without any interference with the right to organize or any other
kind of discrimination. In ordinary situations of this character the Board
directs only reinstatement. The Board has summarized the principle
established by its orders as follows:
"Unlike employees who have been discriminatorily discharged, however, strikers
are awarded back pay only from the date of their application for reinstatement
pursuant to the Board's order to the date upon which the employer complies
with its terms by offering them reinstatement, or, if so ordered, by placing them
on a preferential list for employment when it becomes available."30
The basic reason for this policy established by the Board is to be found
in the intent of the Act. It was designed to furnish an alternative to the
use of self-help by employees against the employer not willing to bargain
collectively in good faith. While the right to strike is not impaired, em-
ployees whose employer refuses to bargain shall be induced to come to
the Board for relief rather than go out on strike. Such conduct would
hardly be encouraged by giving back-pay to strikers who were not dis-
criminated against, even where a strike was caused by an unfair labor
practice. This principle developed and adhered to by the Board actually
affectuates the basic policy of the Act of "encouraging practices funda-
mental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes.' 1
3. The third phase of the irregular status-the quasi-employee status
-is based on the following facts and considerations: Encouragement or
discouragement of membership in a labor organization may occur through
discrimination at the very threshold of the employment relationship.
of the irregular employee status. The remedies of the NLRA are directed against the
unfair labor practice and not against one single expression of this attitude such as discrimina-
tory discharge. NLRA § 10, 29 U. S. C. A. § 160. Otherwise the Board's practice to order
reinstatement not only in cases when unfair labor practice caused the employee to abandon
his job, but even in cases where the employee did not even start to work, because unfair
labor practice prevented his being hired, would be hardly understandable.
30. Third Annual Report of NLRB 210 (1939); see Fourth Annual Report of NLRB
105 (1940).
31. NLRA § 1; 29 U. S. C. A. § 151.
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Then, the door to employment is closed through such discrimination. This
applies to strangers who had never before been hired by the employer or
to individuals who had been employed at some prior time, but not at the
time of application. Such practice is as dangerous to the aims of the Act
as discriminatory discharge.
"A discriminatory refusal to hire is as coercive as a discriminatory discharge."
32
Therefore, the remedies provided by the Act against unfair labor practice
have been applied by the Board in these cases. This practice of the
Board has now been confirmed by the Supreme Court in Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB.33
Section 8 (3) of the Wagner Act in forbidding discrimination in em-
ployment is not limited to those who are employees at the time of the
discrimination. It forbids explicitly discrimination "in regard to hire.1
34
Therefore, the practice of the Board seems to be well founded on the
letter as well as the spirit of the law.3
The Board has summarized its position by saying "that the Act pro-
tects workers against the notorious anti-union blacklist."36 Consequently
the Board has ordered not only "instatement" with back-pay to applicants
for jobs who were discriminatorily rejected, but also to those workers who
did not even apply for employment because they were informed that their
names appeared on the employer's blacklist." This practice, if con-
firmed by the courts, may give the quasi-employee status an importance,
the full extent of which can hardly be foreseen. Perhaps, this practice
may prove to be an effective weapon against blacklisting, perhaps a more
effective one than the various statutes which have been directed against
32. NLRB v. Waumbec Mills, 114 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. Ist, 1940).
33. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177 (1941).
34. RosE=ARB, op. cit. supra, note 18, at 545. Algonquin Printing Co., 1 NLRB 264,
269 (1936); Montgomery Ward & Co., 4 NLRB 1151, 1166 (1938), 9 NLRB 538, 545-552
(1938) (employee refused employment as an "extra"); Kelly Springfield Tire Co., 6 NLRB
325, 330-338 (1938); Knoxville Pub. Co., 12 NLRB 1209, 1222 (1939); Mountain City
Mills Co., 25 NLRB 56 (1940). Strikers who by unfair labor practice are prevented from
being rehired are protected by the same remedies as other new or former employees applying
for a job. Sunshine Hosiery Mills, 1 NLRB 664, 673 (1936); NLRB v. Lightner Pub.
Corp. of Illinois, 113 F. (2d) 621 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
35. See however the dissenting opinion of Stone J., concurred in by Hughes, C. J. in
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177 (1941).
36. Fifth Annual Report of NLRB 39 (1941).
37. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 26 NLRB No. 113 (1940), rev'd, - Fed. (2d)
- (C. C. A. 10th, 1941) (the court found the employees, whom the Board directed to be
instated, guilty of sabotage). See note 8 supra.
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it with little success.3" According to this practice, every worker who is
black-listed acquired the quasi-employee status if he can prove that this
blacklisting caused him not to apply for employment. Moreover, the
fact that he has obtained equivalent employment does not necessarily pre-
vent the Board from directing his instatement with back-pay subject
to certain deductions. In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB the Supreme
Court has stated:
"The mere fact that the victim of discrimination has obtained equivalent em-
ployment does not itself preclude the Board from undoing the discrimination and
requiring employment. But neither does this remedy automatically flow from
the Act itself when discrimination has been found. A statute expressive of
such large policy as that on which the NLRB is based must be broadly phrased
and carries with it the task of administrative application."39
Therefore, it is in the discretionary administrative power of the NLRB
to determine under what circumstances and to what extent the fact of
having obtained equivalent employment may or may not terminate the
remediable irregular status of the employee in question. Furthermore,
the back-pay remedy is entrusted to the Board's discretion so that
deductions may be made not only for the actual earnings by the worker,
but also for what he failed without excuse to earn. As the Suprene
Court states,
"the discretion of the Board is wide enough to keep speculative claims for
deductions within reasonable bounds through flexible procedural devices." 40
II. Implications of the Irregular Status
After the exposition of the conditions necessary to create the three
types of the irregular employee status the question posits itself: What
is the purpose of this status with its three phases? What are its implica-
tions? What features distinguish the status of employees out of work
from the regular case?
Four main features characterize the irregular status: (1) Some of the
rights of the employees, although preserved, become dormant so that
they revive only in case of reinstatement. (2) The irregular employees
38. DAUG:ERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS 3w AmEmCAN INDUsTRY, (5th ed. 1941) 922; Mc-
NAUGHTON, TiH DEVELOP ENT OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, (1941) 26; 179-180.
39. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177 (1941).
40. It is not within the limits of this article to discuss explicitly the numerous formulas
through which the Board tries to pattern its back-pay orders to the circumstances of the
various cases. Nor is it intended to discuss fully the significance of the decision in Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB. Its bearing upon the development of the public administrative law
can hardly be overestimated. See note 94 infra.
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remain members of the bargaining unit, eligible to vot6 for representation
and protected against unfair labor practice. (3) On the other hand, the
irregular status is devoid of substance compared with the regular status.
(4) It is less flexible with regard to the possibility of its dissolution by
discharge than the regular status.
1. Since the individuals out of work are held to be employees, some
of the rights acquired by them through collective agreements or in-
dividual contracts of hiring remain preserved and intact although they
become ineffective or dormant for the time being. For instance such
rights as seniority rights,4 ' rights under an insurance policy,' or to an
interim wage increase,43 or vacation,44 revive in case of reinstatement.
2. As employees they are entitled to protection by the provisions of
the Wagner Act. They are safeguarded in the enjoyment of these rights.
It does not matter whether they were ousted by the employer or quit the
employment voluntarily as a result of unfair labor pratice. A case of the
second type is present in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,
where the U. S. Supreme Court held:
L .. their action is not to be construed as a renunciation of the employment
relation . . . " and " .. . they remain employes for the remedial purposes
specified in the Act and protected against the unfair labor practices denounced
by it."'4")
Protection against unfair labor practice includes protection of strikers
against the consequences of unfair labor practice occurring after the com-
mencement of the strike. They retain their vote in employee elections. 4
The employer is not relieved of his duty to bargain collectively with their
representatives.
41. Crystal Springs Finishing Co., 12 NLRB 1291, 1305 (1939).
42. Continental Oil Co., 12 NLRB 789, 825 (1939).
43. Pioneer Pearl Button Co., I NLRB 837, 840, 846 (1936).
44. Valley Mould & Iron Co., 20 NLRB 18 (1940) aff'd Valley Mould & Iron Co. v.
NLRB, 116 F. (2d) 760 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940). See also in respect of freedom of molestation,
General Shoe Corp., 5 NLRB 1005, 1020 (1938); Ashville Hosiery Co., 11 NLRB 1365,
1380 (1939).
45. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333, 347, 345 (1938), (italics mine).
See note 24 supra.
46. Harris Hub Bed & Spring Co., 13 NLRB 1236 (1939); Seiss Mfg. Co., 7 NLRB 481,
484 (1938); Piedemont Granite Quarries, 8 NLRB 1202, 1207 (1938); R. C. A. Mfg. Co.,
2 NLRB 159, 165 (1936); Saxon Mills, 1 NLRB 153, 156 (1936); Williams Mfg. Co., 6
NLRB 135, 151 (1938); Carrolton Metal Products, 6 NLRB 569, 588 (1938); Crucible
Steel Co., 1 NLRB 545 (1936); Burton Dixie Corp., 29 NLRB No. 86 (1941).
47. "To hold otherwise for the purpose of this bill would be to withdraw the Govern-
ment from the field at the very point where the process of collective bargaining has reached
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3. The fact that these individuals are out of work entails peculiar
factual and legal effects which distinguish markedly the irregular from
the regular employee status. Individuals who do not work, although they
retain the constructive employee status, are not subject to legal implica-
tions which result from the actual rendition of services. The integration
into the business organization is loosened. Because the irregular employee
is actually not working, he is not any longer subject to the continuing
authority of the employer to direct and supervise the rendition of work.
The employer's authority to direct the rendition of services is suspended
until the employee begins working again. In the meantime, the actual
and factual rights and duties which are the core of the employment
relations in the case of employees at work, are suspended. To a consider-
able extent the irregular employee's status is devoid of substance.
4. The lack of actual performance of work has still another con-
sequence. The normal right of the employer to discharge has no normal
occasion for its exercise. The employees are not working, and,
"hence the myriads of reasons for the discharge, such as inefficiency, lateness,
infraction of rules etc. are not available. Neither is the employer in a position
to exercise his legal whim to dismiss an employee because of the color of his
hair .... ",48
On the other hand, in the regular case when the employee is at work,
the employer is free
"to hire or discharge, to promote or demote, to transfer, lay-off or reinstate, or
other wise to affect the hire or tenure of employees or their terms or conditions
of employment, for asserted reasons of business, animosity, or because of sheer
caprice, so long as the employer's conduct is not wholly or in part motivated by
anti-union cause" 49
and so long as such action would not violate any collective agreement.
These rules do not apply to the irregular employee status, which must be
protected against wanton dissolution. If brought about by unfair labor
practice, the remedies provided by the NLRA to protect constructive and
quasi-employees could never serve the purpose of the Act, if their factual
a critical stage." Sen. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Seas. (1941) p. 6. See summary in
Fifth Annual Report of the NLRB 58 (1941).
48. ROSENFARB, op. cit. supra note 18 at 560.
49. Principles established by NLRB. Third Annual Report of the NLRB 65 (1939);
Fourth Annual Report of NLRB 60 (1940); Fifth Annual Report of NLRB 37 (1941).
"In discharging the employees . . .their status as employees was destroyed, so as to exclude
them from the protective operation of the Act." C. G. Conn Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F. (2d)
390, 396, 398 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) wherein employees were discharged previous to any
unfair labor practice or labor dispute.
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basis, the status itself, could be destroyed arbitrarily. What would
become of the right "to engage in concerted activities" which is guaranteed
in Sec. 7 of the NLRA, if the striker could be dismissed without any
cause?"0 It is one of the great and new achievements of the Wagner Act
that it preserves for the individual out of work because of unfair labor
practice or a labor dispute his standing as an employee. This achieve-
ment should not be frustrated by the unilateral action of the employer.
Therefore his right of discharge must be restricted. So must be the right
to select."1 Because of these restrictions in discharging, the irregular
employee status becomes more rigid than the regular one. It is less
flexible as to the possibility of its dissolution by discharge. The nature
and extent of these restrictions will be more fully discussed in the follow-
ing inquiry into the ways to alter and end the irregular employee status.
III. Termination of the Irregular Status
Such an anomalous situation as the irregular employee status is 'not
designed to last. First of all, there is nothing in the Wagner Act which
hinders employees, ousted from their work by unfair labor practice or
out of work because of a labor dispute, from refusing to return to work
and from abandoning their jobs voluntarily." In doing so the employees
concerned may end their irregular employee status by their own free
choice. It is, however, the other side of the coin which causes difficulties.
The employer patently has not the same free choice to terminate the
irregular employee status through discharge. What restrictions are im-
posed upon the employer's right to dissolve the employment relationship
in the case of the irregular status? Deduced from all that has been said
before one point can be stated with certainty: if dischargeable at all, the
irregular employee can be discharged only for particular cause. It seems,
moreover, that the same causes or, at least, approximately the same
causes limit the discretionary power of the Board to order reinstatement5
50. Sunshine Hosiery Mills, 1 NLRB 664, 672, 675 (1936); C. G. Conn Ltd., 10 NLRB
498, 513 (1938). "Without this assurance of the continued protection of the Act, the
striking employee would be quickly put beyond the pale of its protection by discharge,"
dissenting opinion of Reed, J. in NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 266
(1939).
51. "From the date of the respondent's first unfair practice, its ordinary right to select
its employees became vulnerable," Black Diamond S. S. Corp. v. NLRB, 94 F. (2d) 875,
879 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 579 (1938).
52. "There is no basis in the Wagner Act for the Board to compel an employer to take
back employees who have voluntarily refused to return to their jobs being temporarily laid
off for cause .... " NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 106 F. (2d) 119, 124 (C. C. A. 1st,
1939).
53. See Hoeniger op. cit. supra note 1 at 33 note 74.
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If there are facts which may justify discharge or denial of reinstatement,
the entire situation becomes complicated. To the conditions creating
this status a new element is added which encroaches upon the status so
that the employee concerned may be deprived of the remedies or the
protection against discharge. In these complicated cases, therefore, the
irregularity of the status may come to an end because the status itself
is terminated. There is no doubt that the irregular employee who is
denied the right to be reinstated through a final decision ceases to be an
employee at all. The same is true in the case of a valid discharge
of an irregular employee.
In contradistinction to these complicated cases are those in which only
the conditions creating the irregular status prevail and no deteriorating
factor comes in. Therefore, the remedies provided by the Wagner Act
are to be applied to their full extent. The chief remedy is reinstatement.
The reinstated employee who is working again has converted his irregular
status into the regular one. It goes without saying that he continues to
be an employee. Only the irregularity of his status has been terminated.
The following scheme may serve to make perspicuous the discussion of
the details concerning the termination of the irregular status.
The irregular employee status can be terminated:
(1) In the uncomplicated cases where there are no facts impairing
the protective effect of this status: by application of the affirmative
remedies of the Wagner Act such as reinstatement or "instatement."
(2) In the complicated cases where the irregular employee status is
weakened by deteriorating factors in one or two ways, viz: a) by denial
of a remedial order by the Board; b) by discharge of the employer.
This bifurcation of the ways of ending the deteriorated irregular em-
ployee status presents the third main point which has to be discussed.
Many intricate cross relations appear to exist between these two seemingly
different-ending causes of the deteriorated irregular status. The very
same facts are considered under the double aspect of justifying either
discharge or denial of the remedies provided by the Wagner Act. This
viewing of the facts through, so to say, a bifocal lens causes much con-
fusion. This in turn raises doubts as to the correctness of the bi-
furcated way of judging the facts. The attempt to find the path leading
out of this confusion requires a survey of the seemingly distinct ending
causes as they are viewed at present.
(1) The normal way of ending irregularity is to convert it into the
regular state of affairs. Consequently, the NLRA tries to terminate the
irregular status of the employees out of work by bringing them back to
work and thus into the regular status of actually working employees.
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The chief remedies for attaining this goal are orders of the NLRB to
reinstate employees with or without back-pay.5 4  These remedies can
not be applied in an economic strike because of the absence of unfair
labor practice. Moreover, in such a labor dispute the non-remediable
employee status of strikers may be terminated by the employer ex-
ercising his right to replace strikers. In NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co., the Supreme Court stated:
"It does not follow from the Act that an employer, who has not committed unfair
labor practice, has lost the right to protect his business by supplying places left
vacant by strike." 55
If the replacement of the strikers was necessary for the continuation of
the business, the employer will not be found to be engaging in unfair labor
practice by failing to displace the newly hired workers.56 In such a case,
under the authority of the Mackay decision, the strikers concerned may
be said to have lost the strike; the men who took their places remain; the
strikers cease to be employees; their irregular status is terminated.
It must however be kept in mind that, by means of replacement, the
employer can not terminate the non-remediable employee status arbitrar-
ily; and especially not discriminatorily. On the other hand, replacements
in order to insure the continued operation of a plant or a ship were con-
sidered to be sufficiently justified." Moreover, when there remain
vacancies it would constitute discrimination to refuse reinstatement to
strikers because of their participation in the combined labor action 8 In
the past, whenever the circumstances indicated an intent to discriminate
against the returning strikers, the Board tried to prevent recurrence of
this discrimination in the future, by placing them on a preferential list.5 9
Such preferential listing of non-discriminatorily-discharged employees
was, however, held improper by the courts.6
Even the employer, who is guilty of unfair labor practice, does not
54. Back pay is awarded only in cases of discrimination. Third Annual Report of the
NLRB 210 (1939). See note 30 supra.
55. 304 U. S. 333, 345 (1938).
56. Fifth Annual Report of the NLRB 40 (1941). See Calmar Steamship Corp., 22
NLRB No. 33 (1940).
57. Ore Steamship Corp., 29 NLRB No. 137 (1931).
58. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 2 NLRB No. 125, 139, 146 (1936); Wilson and Co.
Inc., 30 NLRB No. 51 (1941).
59. -American Mfg. Co., 7 NLRB 753, 764 (1938), and summary in Fourth Annual
Report of the NLRB 108 (1940), under the heading: Precautionary Orders.
60. NLRB v. Superior Tanning Co., 117 F. (2d) 881 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); cert. denied,
61 Sup. Ct. 834; (the precautionary order was held invalid because punitive in character).
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need to close down his plant. He may also replace the strikers by new
employees. In this case, however, the Board may order reinstatement of
strikers and displacement of those hired after the employer's unfair
labor practice. 61  Where after the dismissal of the newly hired workers
full reinstatement of the irregular employees is impossible, e.g. because
of curtailment of operations or closing down of certain departments, the
situation is remedied in the following way: First the necessary reduction
of the staff is to be made among the employees, the regular as well as
the irregular, on a non-discriminatory basis in accordance with the pre-
vailing system of seniority and other methods in force for reducing the
staff. Second, those irregular employees for whom immediate reinstate-
ment is not available are to be placed upon a preferential list and offered
employment as it becomes available, before other workers are hired.62
The irregular employee whose name has been entered on such a pre-
ferential list by an order, of the Board retains his status. It does not
matter that his reinstatement is conditioned upon the fact that employ-
ment becomes available. Various other conditions63 have been imposed
in reinstatement orders. Whatever these conditions may be, the irregular
status of the employee conditionally ordered to be reinstated is not
terminated by them.
All these cases have been classified as uncomplicated because they do
not offer other difficulties than usually arise in deciding individual cases.
There is no obscurity regarding the principles.
61. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc. et al., 94 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); cert.
denied, 304 U. S. 576, rehearing denied 304 U. S. 590; NLRB v. Lightner Pub. Corp., 113 F.
(2d) 621 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
62. Smith Wood Products Inc., 7 NLRB 950 (1938); Third Annual Report of the
NLRB 201 (1939); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. NLRB, 121 F. (2d) 658 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1941);
Union Drawn Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
63. Williams Motor Co. 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. 413 (1941) (case of discontinuance of a de-
partment when the motive is anti-union). Since the employer is not required to reopen
the department the Board placed the union members on a preferential list for employ-
ment in jobs for which they are qualified. In case of the closing of the plant, the Board
terminated back-pay for the discharged at the time of the closing of the plant, but
ordered reinstatement of the employees if the employer should in the future re-enter such
business or any similar business. Ray Nickols, Inc., 15 NLRB 846 (1939). In the "run
away" plant situation the employer removes its plant in order to avoid bargaining with
a union or paying union wages. The Board has never gone so far as to order the employer
to move back again. It has, however, ordered that the employer either return to the
original location or else pay moving and transportation expenses for union members and their
families. Schieber Millinery Co., 26 NLRB No. 99 (1940), aff'd and modified 116 F. (2d)
281 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940). In re Klotz and Co., 13 NLRB 746, (1939) (order gave the em-
ployees the option of collecting moving expenses for their families or pay for bi-
weekly transportation to visit their families back home.
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2. The complicated cases are shrouded in much confusion with regard
to basic issues. It is highly debated whether and to what extent the
irregular employee status can be dissolved by unilateral action of the
employer, i.e., by discharge." Two extreme views have been advanced
concerning this problem. The one contends that the employer is com-
pletely free to dissolve the irregular employment relation, except if such
a discharge would be solely or preponderantly motivated by the em-
ployer's intent to discriminate among the employees for union activity.6 5
The other extreme leads to the view which denies to the employer the
power to dissolve the employment relation, even upon the ground of un-
lawful conduct, when the misconduct is connected with or constitutes
part of a union activity. Since this will occur in the majority of cases,
when work stopped because of unfair labor practice or labor dispute, this
theory virtually deprives the employer for all practical purposes of his
right to discharge.6" The majority of decisions steer a middle course.
Such a course was inaugurated by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Fan-
steel Metallurgical Corp. 7 They grant to the employer the right to
discharge its employees for cause. The two main causes recognized by
the decisions are breach of agreement 8 and misconduct of the employees.
It is the second of these causes which entails many difficulties, because
not every misconduct justifies the dissolution of the irregular employ-
ment relation. 9 A host of theories have emerged to ascertain the
border line between cases of misconduct which permit the employer to end
64. Announcements regarding discharge have to be weighed very carefully. Board and
Courts have considered an employer's announcement during a strike that, if the employees
do not return to work, they are discharged, as merely a tactical measure to induce the
employees to abandon the strike. Stackpole Carbon Co., 6 NLRB 171, 197 (1938); Sun-
shine Hosiery Mills, 1 NLRB 664, 676 (1936). Hence a distinction must be made between
the purported or tactical discharge to which recognition is refused and an effective discharge
recognized by Board and Court.
65. The rights to hire and to discharge, when exercised for normal ends is held inviolable;
but it may be used to impair the growth of labor organizations. The question whether
the reason for a discharge is only a pretext rather than the motivating cause is held the
Isine qua non test' for a valid discharge. In concurring opinion of Stone J. in NLRB v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 264 (1939). See also Comment (1938) 32 ILL.
L. REv. 568.
66. RosEFAR, op. cit. supra note 18, at 559.
67. 306 U. S. 240, 252-259 (1939).
68. NLRB v. The Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332, 344 (1939); Matter of N. Y. State
Labor Relations Board v. McChesney, 175 Misc. 95, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 771 (1940).
69. "Discharges for law violations per se are not permissible, for the employer could
then utilize every petty violation of an ordinance ... as being an excuse ... to discharge."
RosENPAR, op. cit. supra note 18, at 560. See Note (1939) 17 N. C. L. REv. 438, 442.
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a status which came into existence either by his unfair labor practice
or because of a labor dispute.7°
Of the utmost importance is the fact that the same reasons, or approxi-
mately the same reasons, which have been considered justifying dis-
charge have been regarded also as limiting the Board's discretionary
power to reinstate. Moreover valid discharge for cause and denial of
reinstatement have practically the same effect. They both terminate the
irregular employee status in its deteriorated phase by cancelling the em-
ployee relationship entirely. Nevertheless both ways are distinct in
various regards. It is small wonder that this bifurcation of the way to
the same end entails much ambiguity. A correct analysis of the differences
between these two methods of terminating the irregular employee status
will serve to clarify the issue.
IV. Public and Private Law in Employment Relations
The clue to such an analysis can be found in the majority opinion of the
Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp."1 It
recognized that the affirmative actions to be taken by the Board in order
to effectuate the policies of the Act are not limited to the reinstatement of
employees with or without back-pay which serve as mere examples of
such actions. The discretion of the Board to require such affirmative
actions has been considered-
"broad, but it is not unlimited. It has the essential limitations which inhere in
the very policies of the Act which the Board invokes."72
The ultimate policies of the Wagner Act are preservation and promotion
of industrial peace which can be effectively secured through appropriate
provisions of collective agreements. 3 Consistently employees who were
found to have committed breaches of agreement not to strike were re-
fused reinstatement. 4
The theory of the limitations of the discretionary power of the Board7 5
70. The most contested theories center upon the problem whether and how far employees'
misconduct or offenses are to be condoned, because such might be considered "provoked" by
unfair labor of the employer. Note (1939) 39 Cot.. L. REv. 1369.
71. See note 67 supra.
72. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 257 (1939).
73. See Hoeniger, Social Peace and National Defense (1941) 16 THOUGHT 51, 55.
74. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 96 F. (2d) 948, 953 (C. C. A.
7th, 1938), 306 U. S. 292 (1939); NLRB v. The Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332, 334 (1939).
See, however, dissent of Black J. concurred in by Frankfurter J.
75. "Notwithstanding the mandatory form of Sec. 10 (c) its provisions in substance
leave to the Board some scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion in determining,
upon the basis of the findings, whether the case is one requiring an affirmative order, and in
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explains why reinstatement was refused to employees whose conduct was
found to be contrary to the aims of the Wagner Act.76 With regard to the
application of this theory it is of less importance or even irrelevant
whether the employees guilty of such misconduct had been discharged 77
or not.7" Such cases refer to misconduct of employees which is injurious
to, or at least, disapproved by the employer. Another kind of misconduct
may be harmful to fellow workers, and particularly to their efforts toward
self-organization. Since self-organization for the purpose of collective
bargaining is encouraged by the Wagner Act, the Board followed the
principle, guilding as well as limiting its discretion, when it refused rein-
statement to a discharged employee who offered to serve the employer
as a labor spy.79
In order to effectuate the policies of the Act the Board orders even
strangers who never have been employees of this employeer to be
"instated", thus creating the quasi-employee status which has been dis-
cussed above.8" Furthermore, the Supreme Court has approved the
Board's position by ordering reinstatement or "instatement" of em-
ployees who, after they were discriminated against, have obtained
equivalent employment elsewhere.8' In the case of unfair labor practice
it remains no longer a decisive factor whether the worker injured by this
unfair labor practice comes under the definition of an "employee" in
Sec. 2 (3) of the NLRA. Moreover, the Board's discretionary power in
choosing the particular affirmative relief to be ordered, 11 NLRB v. Pennsylvania Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261, 265 (1938). See also NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 47 (1937). Cf. NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 106 F. (2d) 119, 124
(C. C. A. 1st, 1939); McNeely & Price Co. v. NLRB, 106 F. (2d) 878, 880 (C. C. A. 3d,
1939); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F. (2d) 472, 479 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939); NLRB v.
Elkland Leather Co., Inc., 6 Lab. Rel. Rep. 830 (1940) (reinstatement of strikers convicted
of rioting during the strike caused by unfair labor practice) ; NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co.,
301 U. S. 49, 57 (1937). See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 258
(1939) (the Supreme Court held that the Board had transcended the limits of its discretionary
power in this particular instance.)
76. Nothing prevents the employer from discharging an employee whose reinstatement
the Board refused to order and who had not been discharged before. Note (1939) 39 COL.
L. REv. 1369.
77. As in NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (1939).
78. Note the refusal in the Fansteel case to reinstate the abettors of strike who never were
discharged, where the court said: "If it be assumed that by virtue of Sec. 2 (3) they still
had the status of 'employees,' that provision did not automatically provide reinstatement.
Whether the Board could order it must turn on the application of the provision empowering
the Board" to grant relief. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 260 (1939).
79. Thompson Cabinet Co., 11 NLRB 1106, 1113 (1939).
80. See page 396 supra.
81. See page 397 supra.
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applying the affirmative remedies is not excluded if the employee con-
cerned has been discharged by the employer. Ex-employees as well as
non-employees who are discriminated against may be ordered to be
re-employed or "instated". The only supposition for the applicability of
these remedies is unfair labor practice of the employer.
Unless the employer is guilty of unfair labor practice, the decision of
the employer retains its full significance even so far as the irregular status
of the employee out of work is concerned. In this case, however, the
status is not remediable, and the NLRB has no jurisdiction with regard
to Sec. 10 of Act concerning prevention of unfair labor practice.8 2
The irregular not remediable employee status can be terminated by
valid discharge for reason. In this regard, it is of particular importance
* that the employer's interest to continue his business has to be taken into
consideration. Hence the right to replace strikers obtains.83 Replace-
ment in such cases actually amounts to discharge. Discharge in turn
is the way of terminating contractual employment relations which are
based on the contract of hiring. Therefore, we may say: As long as there
is no unfair labor practice, the irregular employee status remains in the
sphere of contractual relations or in the sphere of private law. The fact
that the irregular employee of the non-remediable type can only be dis-
charged for reason,8 4 may modify but does not basically alter or eliminate
the contractual relationship founded upon private law.
This legal situation changes completely as soon as unfair labor
practice enters the scene. Then the jurisdiction of the NLRB is estab-
lished. Its power to prevent any person from engaging in unfair labor
practices is exclusive. It can not be affected by any other means of
adjustment which have been or may be established by agreements or
,otherwise." 5  The NLRB is a public administrative agency. The
82. See notes 15, 16 supra.
83. Ore Steamship Corp., 29 NLRB No. 137 (1941). The Board has gone very far in
granting the employer the right to replace strikers. The union participated in a sit-down
strike on shipboard and adopted a policy of preventing any of the employer's ships from
sailing. The employer instructed the shipping masters to furnish a new crew which would
not be likely to engage in a "sit-down strike." The sit-down strike was not motivated by
any unfair labor practice of the employer. The Board found that its action in hiring
a new crew, which was not likely to engage in a sit-down strike, was not motivated by
the desire to discriminate against union members but was a matter of business expediency.
The Board so holds, although this actually means selecting of non-union members. Business
judgment, the Board declares, demanded that the management should thus guard against
strikes. See also notes 56-60 supra.
84. The important fact may be emphasized again, that in these cases the reason for
discharge may be based on the employer's interest. See notes 50, 83 supra.
85. NLRA § 10a, 29 U. S. C. A. § 160 (a). See NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.,
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remedies provided by the NLRA for the prevention of engaging in unfair
labor practice are of public law in character. Unfair labor practice when
committed transforms the irregular employee status; it transforms this
status from the spheres of private law to those of public law.
The public law nature of the remedial irregular status gives us the
clue to the fact that in this case the usual means of terminating the
employee status, such as discharge, are relegated into the background.
Unfair labor practice is considered against the public interest and calls
for remedies in order to effectuate the public policy of the Wagner Act.
The question which arises in a given instance is: What remedies fit best
to achieve this purpose? It is of less or no importance at all whether
beneficiaries of these remedies may be ex-employees or non-employees.
Only the effectuation of the policies of the Act count. As soon as unfair
labor practice has occurred, we should stop to consider the consequences
under the private law and contractual concept of discharge. 6 Thus we
would place in correct focus the public law problems which center upon
the application provided by the Wagner Act. 7
Serious problems as to the applicability of these affirmative remedies
arise only in complicated cases. In such cases either misconduct of the
employees concerned or other particular circumstances make it ques-
120 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941); NLRB v. Hawk and Buck Co., Inc., 120 F. (2d) 903
(C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
86. "A misconception of the nature of the Board's process may arise from the fact that
in the enforcement of the public right to have the channels of interstate commerce freed
from obstructions resulting from unfair labor practices a private right of an employee may
incidentally be protected or enforced. Even though private relief is thus afforded it never-
theless remains true that the Board's powers may be invoked only when there is a public
right to be protected and that its processes are never available to a private suitor." NLRB
v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F. (2d) 262, 268 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941).
87. "No private right of action is contemplated. Essentialy the unfair labor practices
listed are matters of public concern, by their nature and consequences. . . . " H. R. R .
No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 21. See Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 309 U. S. 261, 265 (1940), where the court states "The Board seeks enforcement
as a public agent, not to give effect to a 'private administrative remedy'." In National
Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U. S. 350, 362 the Court says: "The proceeding authorized to be
taken by the Board under the National Labor Relations Act is not for the adjudication of
private rights.... It has few of the indicia of a private litigation and makes no requirement
for the presence in it of any private party other than the employer charged with an unfair
labor practice. The Board acts in a public capacity to give effect to the declared public
policy of the Act."
In Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 193, 194 (1941) the court says: "The Board,
we have held very recently, does not exist for the 'adjudication of private rights'; it 'acts
in a public capacity.' . . . The Act does not create rights for individuals which must be
vindicated according to a rigid scheme of remedies."
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tionable whether or to what extent these remedies are to be granted.
Misconduct of the employees concerned or the other conditions were said
to have deteriorated the remediable irregular employee status, i.e. lessened
or even discarded the applicability of the remedies. There was seemingly
a bifurcation of the way in which this deteriorated phase of the irregular
status could be ended: discharge for cause or denial of the remedy.
Now we have come to realize that as a consequence of unfair labor
practice of the employer this kind of the irregular employee status is
governed by public law. Therefore, we know that there is no room for
applying private law methods such as discharge. Board and Courts re-
cently have done their best to clarify that in these cases it has become
irrelevant whether the employees concerned have been discharged
or not.88 There is actually no bifurcation of the way leading to the
termination of this status. It can be terminated only by the public law
methods of granting or denying the remedies provided by the Wagner
Act. The problem remains to find out the principles which determine
the boundary line of the Board's discretion to grant or refuse the
affirmative remedies in question.
This problem has been approached with some success along the
following line: the decisions of the Board ordering or refusing rein-
statement, etc. are considered as equitable remedies.8 9 Therefore, they
will be denied to those who come to the Courts with unclean hands.90
Their action is said to have raised an estoppel9 against the procuration
of benefits under the NLRA which aims to free the employer-employee
relationship from "interference and coercion from any source." 92  In
general it can be said: through violation of the law, or other misconduct,
or finally through circumstances which come within their responsibilities
the irregular employees may forfeit their privileged status and lose the
protection" of public law which is involved in the remedies provided by
the Wagner Act.
88. See note 87 supra.
89. Restoration to service is more or less the specific performance of a personal service
contract. CLARK, PaINCIPLES OF EQUITY (1919), 62, 63, 78; Stone, The "Mutuality" Ride
in New York (1916), 16 COL. L. REv. 443. See further, Note (1939) 48 YAL. L. J. 1265.
90. Comment (1939) 37 MIcH. L. RE V. 1256, 1272; 38 COL. L. Ray. 1507 (1938). But for
a repudiation of the "clean hands" doctrine in proceedings for enforcement of the Board's
reinstatement order: See NLRB v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 533, 540 (C. C. A. 9th,
1938).
91. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 96 F. (2d) 948, 953 (C. C. A.
7th, 1938); Standard Lime & Stone Co. v. NLRB, 97 F. (2d) 531, 535 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
92. RosE.NAB, op. cit. supra, note 18, at 561, 648-655.
93. See summary in the Fourth Annual Report of the NLRB 105 (1940), under the
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The various theories discussed above which try to determine the
criteria for justification of discharge present valuable principles. They,
however, find their chief basis in the sphere of contractual relations, i.e.
in the sphere of private law. Therefore, the ideas set forth in these
theories may be applied only in an analogous way, until they are adapted
to the public law foundation of the remedies clarified in recent decisions
of the Supreme Court.
Conclusion
The decisive conclusion which we have arrived at is that the remediable
irregular employee status is established by means of public law. The
remedies are derived out of public law; they are administered by a public-
administrative agency. Its orders are subject to the review of the courts
only as to their arbitrariness, unreasonableness or caprice.94
In antithesis to this conclusion we must recall our point of departure.
We departed from the contract of hiring, i.e. doubtlessly from a private
law aspect. We termed the employment relation based upon such a
contract as regular as long as the employee concerned is actually at work.
From this point of view the distinction whether the employment condi-
tions were 'bargained collectively or individually has led only to sub-
divisions of this status. 5 The Wagner Act extends the employee status
to those employees who are out of work because of a labor dispute or
of unfair labor practice. We termed this status irregular.96 We came,
however, to realize the seemingly bewildering fact that this status in-
cludes also non-employees or ex-employees who are discriminated against.
In these cases there was to be found no contract of hiring at all, or that
if such a contract had existed it had definitely terminated. These cases
remain perplexing only so long as we continue to comprehend them under
the private law aspect of the contract of hiring. The apparent paradox
disappears when it becomes clear that unfair labor practice creates a
status for employees or prospective employees which is based on public
law. It is the paramount significance of unfair labor practice that it
changes completely the importance of the private law relations derived
from the contract of hiring.
heading: Effect on Board Orders of Violent or Unlawful Conduct on the Part of Employees
who were Discriminatorily discharged or who went on strikes in protest against Unfair
Labor Practice.
94. In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 196 (1941) the Supreme court has
emphasized the system of "restricted judicial review in relation to the wide discretionary
authority which Congress has given the Board."
95. Hoeniger, op. cit. supra note 1, at 32.
96. Hoeniger, op. cit. supra note 1, at 34.
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The individual contract of hiring under the Wagner Act becomes
almost irrelevant or, at least, non essential as soon as unfair labor
practice occurs. As long as the irregular employee status of those
workers who are out of work because of a labor dispute does not involve
unfair labor practice, the private law relations prevail. This status can
be terminated by discharge for cause or by replacement of strikers.
Unfair labor practice creates an irregular employee status sui generis
based on public law. This status can be terminated only by granting
or refusing the affirmative remedies against unfair labor practice.
In contradistinction to the subdivisions of the irregular status which we
made above departing from the contract of hiring, the results of this
tentative analysis can be summarized in another graph:
Irregular Employee Status of Workers Out of Work
no unfair labor practice
status remains predominantly in the
sphere of contractual relations, and
thus of private law
termination through:
separation of the conversion into
contractual rela- the regular
tions: status:




status as based on public law:
contractual relations non-essential
termination through:
affirmative order denial of
of the board remedy
if complied with, loss of
conversion into the status
the regular
status
The negative statement, that the existence or continuation of an
individual contract of hiring ceases to be a decisive factor in case of un-
fair labor practice of the employer, ought not to conclude this tentative
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analysis of the individual employment contract under the Wagner Act.
There is a positive complement to this negative result. The privileged
protection of employees in the irregular status as a consequence of unfair
labor practice is based on public law and entails, at least, semi-public
duties of the protected individuals as well as unionsY 7
This important corollary" of the privileges of labor has been discerned
and perceived by an analysis of the bulk of precedents concerning the
pertinent part of the NLRA. This searching inquiry was aimed not in
the main at the clarification of some particulars, but rather at the finding
out of some leading principles or the philosophy behind these particulars.
Research guided by such an aim tends toward the goal of bringing about
a Jurisprudence of Industrial Relations.9
97. Not only the individual workers but also the unions are protected by statutory pro-
visions of a public law nature. "The policy of these statutes can be justified because
properly developed self-organizations invigorate collective bargaining. It has to be kept
in mind that only a sound development of union is to be encouraged and protected. Unions
which can become exclusive representatives of groups of employees, covering as their
bargaining unit also non-union members, cease to be merely private associations. They
assume a quasi-public character and must, therefore, take over quasi-public obligations....
In the long run, unions will continue to enjoy the privileged status of being protected and
encouraged by law, even at the expense of some individual rights, if they conclusively
demonstrate fulfillment of their quasi-public duties." Hoeniger, Labor Law-An Instrument
for Social Peace and Progress (1940) FORD AM Uiav. SoCAL STUDIES 21-22.
98. If this corollary concerning the public duties and responsibilities were recognized and
made a guiding principle in decisions, the often deplored one-sidedness of the Wagner Act
would disappear. A well-founded doctrine of the public duties of labor which correspond
to the privileges based on public law would certainly prove to be more effective than
statutory provisions establishing unfair labor practice of employees in certain cases such
as breach of contract, sit-down strike, etc. See Wisconsin Employment Peace Act. Wis.
STAT. '(1939) 111.06.
99. Jurisprudence of Industrial Relations has many patent ramifications. Collective
agreements, because of the regulatory effect of their provisions, produce a bulk of labor
law. Hoeniger, op. cit. supra note 1 at 35. By systematically surveying such provisions
and prudently applying the method of generalization, important principles can be dis-
closed. Proceeding in such a way, Professor Sumner H. Slichter has recently announced
the "temergence of a system of Industrial Jurisprudence.". Su caaH, UKEoN Poucrms AN
INDUSIAR MANAGE NT (1941) 1. Another branch of the Jurisprudence of Industrial
Relations will certainly emerge if and when the bulk of cases and precedents resulting from
the application of the statutes concerning industrial relations will have been surveyed and
systematized in a similar way.
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